exposure mechanism
Choosing Online Experiment Designs under Interference in Ads, Recommendations, and Member-Experience Systems
Shekhar, Prashant, Howard, Caroline
Online experiments in ads, recommendation, and member-experience systems are often planned before the dominant interference mechanism is known. A treatment may propagate through budgets, inventory, producer exposure, graph spillovers, or temporal carryover, making the randomization design itself a statistical decision. We formulate this problem as robust design selection over uncertain exposure mechanisms. Given a finite catalog of six implementable designs, the selector compares each design by worst-case planning risk over an ambiguity set. The risk combines exposure bias, assignment-unit variance, minimum detectable effect, contamination or carryover, operational cost, and estimand mismatch. For theoretical justification, the paper develops a geometry-aware guarantee, stating that design bias is bounded by Wasserstein distance to the launch exposure distribution, and this penalty is minimax tight under Lipschitz exposure response. We also prove finite-catalog approximation and a robust selector theorem with excess-risk control, exact recovery under separation, and certified shortlists when the risk surface is flat. Empirically, the same selector gives different recommendations across samples from public datasets. It selects user-randomization on Criteo ads with dimensionless robust risk 1.295, switchbacks on Open Bandit-bts/men with risk 2.105, and cluster-randomization on KuaiRand with risk 2.240. The Open Bandit case stresses known but uneven logging support, with propensities from 0.00006 to 0.594 and a 5.17% IPS effective-sample share. Overall, the paper contributes an interference-aware experiment design framework based on mechanism-robust design decisions, where the output is either a justified design choice or an uncertainty shortlist.
Adversarial Counterfactual Learning and Evaluation for Recommender System
The feedback data of recommender systems are often subject to what was exposed to the users; however, most learning and evaluation methods do not account for the underlying exposure mechanism. We first show in theory that applying supervised learning to detect user preferences may end up with inconsistent results in the absence of exposure information. The counterfactual propensity-weighting approach from causal inference can account for the exposure mechanism; nevertheless, the partial-observation nature of the feedback data can cause identifiability issues. We propose a principled solution by introducing a minimax empirical risk formulation. We show that the relaxation of the dual problem can be converted to an adversarial game between two recommendation models, where the opponent of the candidate model characterizes the underlying exposure mechanism. We provide learning bounds and conduct extensive simulation studies to illustrate and justify the proposed approach over a broad range of recommendation settings, which shed insights on the various benefits of the proposed approach.
Adversarial Counterfactual Learning and Evaluation for Recommender System
The feedback data of recommender systems are often subject to what was exposed to the users; however, most learning and evaluation methods do not account for the underlying exposure mechanism. We first show in theory that applying supervised learning to detect user preferences may end up with inconsistent results in the absence of exposure information. The counterfactual propensity-weighting approach from causal inference can account for the exposure mechanism; nevertheless, the partial-observation nature of the feedback data can cause identifiability issues. We propose a principled solution by introducing a minimax empirical risk formulation. We show that the relaxation of the dual problem can be converted to an adversarial game between two recommendation models, where the opponent of the candidate model characterizes the underlying exposure mechanism.
Adversarial Counterfactual Learning and Evaluation for Recommender System
Xu, Da, Ruan, Chuanwei, Korpeoglu, Evren, Kumar, Sushant, Achan, Kannan
The feedback data of recommender systems are often subject to what was exposed to the users; however, most learning and evaluation methods do not account for the underlying exposure mechanism. We first show in theory that applying supervised learning to detect user preferences may end up with inconsistent results in the absence of exposure information. The counterfactual propensity-weighting approach from causal inference can account for the exposure mechanism; nevertheless, the partial-observation nature of the feedback data can cause identifiability issues. We propose a principled solution by introducing a minimax empirical risk formulation. We show that the relaxation of the dual problem can be converted to an adversarial game between two recommendation models, where the opponent of the candidate model characterizes the underlying exposure mechanism. We provide learning bounds and conduct extensive simulation studies to illustrate and justify the proposed approach over a broad range of recommendation settings, which shed insights on the various benefits of the proposed approach.